Thursday, February 26, 2015

What to Do about Dwindling Offense in MLB?

The new commissioner is on it, don't allow defensive shifts, put a clock on the pitchers, lower the mound, sure why not. I think defensive shifts are definitively affecting offense, it's a short term technological information advantage and the solution is obvious with no need for league interference. Hitters need to beat the shift end of story. The thing no one is talking about is the take over of specialized pitching. We have gone way past the specialization of closers, loogys the 7 inning starter. we now have pitchers assigned by inning to go 1 inning and throw max velocity. Wade Davis you are this trend. 7 innings? 6 innings? forget about it starters give me 5 or even 4. This requires a 12-13 man staff, 9 position players leaves either a 3 or 4 man bench. In the NL because they have to pinch hit for pitchers it's a 5 man bench. For me 5 man bench is a minimum needed to have a full strategic array to a manager. Current AL benches are not designed for run production, but for run prevention. Either the bench has a few defensive specialists or multi-position guys who have no value except being able to look functional at multiple positions- thus they exist to allow for more relievers and prevent runs.

A four man bench (there are some 3 man benches) has to have a catcher, a utility infielder (often not known for hitting) 1 outfielder and somebody else - shockingly often not an offensive player often an opposite platoon to a starter with an extreme split. In the post before my recreation of game 1 2014 season KC-DET-  the Royals had
back up catcher Brett Hayes- no bat skills whatsoever
                          Pedro Ciriaco- utility man can play 2b, SS, 3b and can't hit
                          Jarrod Dyson - LH defensive outfielder who can also pinch run and hit a little versus                           RH
                          our hero Danny Valencia- 3b platoon slugger vs LH and was often forced to play positions he had no skill whatsoever at like 2b.

The Royals bench with at least 2 usable offensive players including a defensive replacement and pinch runner actually is one of the better AL benches. We traded Valencia later so we could get Jayson Nix's .120 batting average (but plays almost every position) but I digress,

Here are some other opening day 2014 benches
Det: B Holiday, Don Kelly, Andrew Romine, Tyler Collins
Oak: D Norris, D Barton,  N Punto, S Fuld
Bal: S Clevenger, R Flaherty, S Lombardozzi, D Lough
LAA: H Conger, C Cowgil, J McDonald, I Stewart

Those are the playoff teams. From those benches I count 1 true bat Norris a catcher, maybe D Lough but not last year. These benches of the best teams are almost purely designed to prevent runs not score them.

If Moneyball  taught us to value and take advantage of what's undervalued by the league whether that's on base % in the 90's or what followed through the years in my read the current inefficiency that teams are missing is returning to a strong bench with offensive options. The Royals have some options. The other problem with a 4 man bench is you are constantly afraid to play your 1 offensive card too early meaning the other manager can load up and use his pen to neutralize your lineup. That's why I pinch hit for Moustakas in the 5th and Yost couldn't pull the trigger then because he has nothing left on his bench, maybe he uses a pinch hitter in the 9th but can't use up your last catcher, that's not smart baseball and so it goes so you do nothing and give the advantage to the defense.

In 1985 playoffs where the Royals lucked into a championship they first had to get by a very good Toronto Blue Jay team. There was no luck in that 7 game series Dick Howser simply out managed Bobby Cox. The Blue Jays were a heavy platoon team (Mullinicks and G Iorg  etc). Howser made the inverse strategy play that I executed in the season opener yesterday for the same reasons, make a disadvantage your advantage, protect your teams weaknesses. The Royals had a fine starting staff but Howser routinely pulled them early in the series to force a decision on Cox, "Accept the platoon disadvantage for several innings or pinch hit now and face it later." The added advantage our closer Dan Quisenberry struggled against LH batters. Howser was clearing a path for his closer.
Game 1: C Leibrant (LH)  pulled 3rd inning RH S Farr on
Game 3 B Saberhagan (RH) out in 5th (he won the Cy Young) B Black in (LH)
Game 6 Gubisca (RH) out 6th Black in
Game 7 Saberhagan out 4th Leibrandt (LH) in

Current MLB dynamics beg for a manager to be the 1 team with a potent bench and shorter pen. 14/11 or even 15/10 for the very bold. To do this relievers must be prepared as multi inning pitchers 2 -3 innings and set it up as a series rotation almost. Colorado briefly and  halfheartedly tried this a few years ago but had poor pitchers-poor result. They had starters going 4 innings with 2 pre-determined relievers. Results weren't magically there and the heat- second guessing lead to abandoning it. It would not have to be even that elaborate, you want starters to go deep but rotate middle guys, keep closer as is but lengthen to some 2 inning saves, and have 1 long/swing man ala  Baltimore of the Weaver era, In fact that role would be perfect for the best pitching prospect in organization, fewer but controlled innings still could be high impact and prepare for rotation next season (Johan Santana) for Royals that would be D Duffy role last year or Ventura goal 90-130 innings.

Shifting et all factors in the offensive decline, but what I see the biggest factor is the devaluing of offensive  role players and the emphasis on run prevention in almost all personnel decisions.

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